11-29-2016, 11:42 PM
for sure, it is mind bogglingly complicated. . . far more complicated than a single paragraph on the thread of a social media message board could comprehensively unpack. but, i am not suggesting that 'society' is necessarily a bad thing. rather, a society that makes categorical value judgements about 'feelings' and 'thoughts' even 'impulses', is far from a healthy one. Once merely feeling angry, for example, becomes unacceptable, you're looking at thought crimes. . . and then. . . you're living in 1984.
find below a short extract from my essay on Klossowski's interpretation of Nietzsche, specifically focusing on the 'gregarious/singular' dichotomy. i will also attach a bibliography of books i used to write the essay at the bottom:
Here we arrive at the crux of the distinction between the ‘gregarious’ and the ‘singular.’ The gregarious is that which attempts to communicate in order to stabilize and secure. Gregariousness is a social survival technique and is related to the code of everyday signs and the simulacra (and simulacrum). As we have seen from the comments above concerning philosophy and philosophers, the dominant impulse, which is fundamentally incoherent and related to the singular case or the idiosyncratic, is mimed in accordance to the code of everyday signs. The idiosyncratic (from the Greek idiosugkrasia literally meaning, ‘personal mixing together‘), the singular, is covered over by the gregarious due to the fact that the singular poses a threat to the gregarious, a threat to the species [humanity]. This covering over, in turn (and if allowed to maintain a certain consistency, or, consistency of development) “disturbs the sensitivity of individuals.” [NVC: p. 4]
Early on in ‘Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle’ we find mention of the sick and healthy in relation to the gregarious and singular.
According to Klossowski the ‘moral question’ should not be posed in terms of, right/wrong, true/false, etc. but rather, in terms of the sick and the healthy. Nietzsche, as always, is not content with making the gregarious exclusively applicable to the sick or the healthy; or, determining the singular in like manner. Nietzsche tells us that initially the gregarious springs from that which “have the character of sickness” [ibid] due to the fact that the singular (which is the initial impulse) stands in direct opposition to the gregarious, the species, humanities survival. The singular disrupts the code of everyday signs that are systems of security, ensuring the survival of the species. Here we can see the tension between the singular and the gregarious. The singular wishes to assert its own will, its own power, and this will be at the expense of the community (if we narrow the global species down to communities). The singular stands out against the restrictions of the constraining power of the gregarious - is not the singular a dangerous glitch in the sanctuary of the gregarious, the social, the communicable, the code of everyday signs? Yet, this initial sickness is only the beginning of the story. Klossowski says of the gregarious that it is “the levelling power” [NVC: p. 5]1 and that the singular is an ‘erectile power.’ Furthermore, the gregarious amount to a mediocrity whereby singular cases, high intensities of moods, impulses, tonalities of the soul, etc. are suppressed by the generality of the gregarious. George Bernard Shaw [1856 - 1950] once said that, “the reasonable man adapts himself to the world; the unreasonable one persists in trying to adapt the world to himself. Therefore, all progress depends on the unreasonable man,” and if one replace the ‘reasonable’ and the ‘unreasonable’ with the gregarious and the idiosyncratic, respectively, one begins to appreciate the delicate arrangement between the gregarious and the singular case; in this sense, the singular, or idiosyncratic, may ultimately define its own restrictions and become gregarious. Nietzsche states that, “the first explosion of force and will to self-determination is a sickness that can destroy humanity; and even more sickly are the first, strange, wild attempts of the mind to adjust the world to itself, to its own authority” [ibid]. (It is important also to note that whereas Shaw’s emphasis is on progression, with the implication of social progress, Nietzsche will not speak in such terms - Nietzsche‘s is a singular progress).
However, Nietzsche makes an important distinction between two cultures: 1) the conceptual culture that is founded on the gregarious, and 2) lived culture, that “can never have a gregarious foundation.” [NVC: p. 6] The lived culture is that of the impulses, the singular - a conceptual culture is a re-presenting, or, simulacra. Klossowski contends that the mere fact that we have a concept of culture shows a covering over of the lived culture.
It is with this distinction between conceptual culture and lived culture, between the gregarious and the idiosyncratic, that Nietzsche talks about the ’combat against culture.’ But, what are we to make of this combat? Nietzsche states that we must take sides, see what’s problematic in culture, what is beneficial to us as individuals, etc. Where does culture restrict, and what does it allow? How far can we go, and where are the routes blocked?
Now, we should note that this culture is just that culture that Nietzsche himself has inherited; it is this culture that has delivered us Nietzsche - and yet, Nietzsche would see this culture burn as he once imagined how he would revel in the “marvels of the Louvre in flames” [NVC: p. 10]. On the one hand we have the combat of the lived culture by the conceptual [gregarious] culture, and on the other we have Nietzsche’s own combat of conceptual culture in favour of the lived culture.
According to Klossowski, culture cannot be a fixed entity (once and for all) because the very nature of culture is becoming; any appeal to simulacra stands in direct opposition to culture. It is this very fixing of a concept of culture that prompts Nietzsche to refer it to the slave type; for, it is the slave type that will accept the foundations of a conceptual culture without questioning the masters that had invented it. This discussion relates directly to the discussions of the valuations good/bad and good/evil in ‘The Genealogy of Morals.’
It is through the gregarious that conceptual culture (or, the conceptualization of culture) covers over the very arbitrariness of the values created. No one questions these values, these morals, right, wrong, truth, falsehood - in fact, these antitheses are the very product of a conceptually gregarious culture. This may be what Gilles Deleuze would refer to as an overcoding of values, whereby the values are coded to fit a particular system of articulation (maybe Ludwig Wittgenstein would refer to these systems as ‘Language Games’) and then overcoded in order to conceal the arbitrary nature of those systems; this, in turn, provides the security of the species by applying the code to other areas until one no longer wills oneself. Overcoding, put simply, ensures the survival of the species by ensuring the dominance of the code.
What is lacking in the conceptual culture, or, as Klossowski would have it, what is covered over, is the ‘the fact of experimentation.’ Can a culture, a lived culture, survive this lack? What does culture amount to if it only repeats, replicates, re-establishes, the status quo? And here we have the combat of culture. But, and again, Nietzsche is on the offensive, waging his own war on the conceptual culture of the gregarious. In Nietzsche’s combat there are to be no sacred cows. Language itself must be uprooted! Nietzsche’s mission statement is, “to give men back the courage of their natural drives / to check their self-underestimation… / to remove antitheses from things after comprehending that we have projected them there…” [NVC: p. 10]. Yet, why courage? Nietzsche believes that inequality prevails, yet, this inequality is not reflected in the gregarious and thus man has lost his courage to bear this inequality. The idea of the Eternal Return will serve to bring this courage back to man and ultimately split humanity down the middle, into those that accept the Return and those that do not. In which case, the question of advocacy of Nietzsche’s own combat against culture will depend on whether one is willing to accept the implications of the Eternal Return.
NVC: Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle: Pierre Klossowski
AC: The Anti-Christ: Friedrich Nietzsche
BGE: Beyond Good and Evil: Friedrich Nietzsche
GM: The Genealogy of Morals: Friedrich Nietzsche
GMM: Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals (on a supposed right to lie because of philanthropic concerns): Immanuel Kant
BHP: A Brief History of the Paradox: Roy Sorensen
IV: The Investigations: Ludwig Wittgenstein
PN: The Philosophy of Nietzsche: Gilles Deleuze
find below a short extract from my essay on Klossowski's interpretation of Nietzsche, specifically focusing on the 'gregarious/singular' dichotomy. i will also attach a bibliography of books i used to write the essay at the bottom:
Here we arrive at the crux of the distinction between the ‘gregarious’ and the ‘singular.’ The gregarious is that which attempts to communicate in order to stabilize and secure. Gregariousness is a social survival technique and is related to the code of everyday signs and the simulacra (and simulacrum). As we have seen from the comments above concerning philosophy and philosophers, the dominant impulse, which is fundamentally incoherent and related to the singular case or the idiosyncratic, is mimed in accordance to the code of everyday signs. The idiosyncratic (from the Greek idiosugkrasia literally meaning, ‘personal mixing together‘), the singular, is covered over by the gregarious due to the fact that the singular poses a threat to the gregarious, a threat to the species [humanity]. This covering over, in turn (and if allowed to maintain a certain consistency, or, consistency of development) “disturbs the sensitivity of individuals.” [NVC: p. 4]
Early on in ‘Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle’ we find mention of the sick and healthy in relation to the gregarious and singular.
According to Klossowski the ‘moral question’ should not be posed in terms of, right/wrong, true/false, etc. but rather, in terms of the sick and the healthy. Nietzsche, as always, is not content with making the gregarious exclusively applicable to the sick or the healthy; or, determining the singular in like manner. Nietzsche tells us that initially the gregarious springs from that which “have the character of sickness” [ibid] due to the fact that the singular (which is the initial impulse) stands in direct opposition to the gregarious, the species, humanities survival. The singular disrupts the code of everyday signs that are systems of security, ensuring the survival of the species. Here we can see the tension between the singular and the gregarious. The singular wishes to assert its own will, its own power, and this will be at the expense of the community (if we narrow the global species down to communities). The singular stands out against the restrictions of the constraining power of the gregarious - is not the singular a dangerous glitch in the sanctuary of the gregarious, the social, the communicable, the code of everyday signs? Yet, this initial sickness is only the beginning of the story. Klossowski says of the gregarious that it is “the levelling power” [NVC: p. 5]1 and that the singular is an ‘erectile power.’ Furthermore, the gregarious amount to a mediocrity whereby singular cases, high intensities of moods, impulses, tonalities of the soul, etc. are suppressed by the generality of the gregarious. George Bernard Shaw [1856 - 1950] once said that, “the reasonable man adapts himself to the world; the unreasonable one persists in trying to adapt the world to himself. Therefore, all progress depends on the unreasonable man,” and if one replace the ‘reasonable’ and the ‘unreasonable’ with the gregarious and the idiosyncratic, respectively, one begins to appreciate the delicate arrangement between the gregarious and the singular case; in this sense, the singular, or idiosyncratic, may ultimately define its own restrictions and become gregarious. Nietzsche states that, “the first explosion of force and will to self-determination is a sickness that can destroy humanity; and even more sickly are the first, strange, wild attempts of the mind to adjust the world to itself, to its own authority” [ibid]. (It is important also to note that whereas Shaw’s emphasis is on progression, with the implication of social progress, Nietzsche will not speak in such terms - Nietzsche‘s is a singular progress).
However, Nietzsche makes an important distinction between two cultures: 1) the conceptual culture that is founded on the gregarious, and 2) lived culture, that “can never have a gregarious foundation.” [NVC: p. 6] The lived culture is that of the impulses, the singular - a conceptual culture is a re-presenting, or, simulacra. Klossowski contends that the mere fact that we have a concept of culture shows a covering over of the lived culture.
It is with this distinction between conceptual culture and lived culture, between the gregarious and the idiosyncratic, that Nietzsche talks about the ’combat against culture.’ But, what are we to make of this combat? Nietzsche states that we must take sides, see what’s problematic in culture, what is beneficial to us as individuals, etc. Where does culture restrict, and what does it allow? How far can we go, and where are the routes blocked?
Now, we should note that this culture is just that culture that Nietzsche himself has inherited; it is this culture that has delivered us Nietzsche - and yet, Nietzsche would see this culture burn as he once imagined how he would revel in the “marvels of the Louvre in flames” [NVC: p. 10]. On the one hand we have the combat of the lived culture by the conceptual [gregarious] culture, and on the other we have Nietzsche’s own combat of conceptual culture in favour of the lived culture.
According to Klossowski, culture cannot be a fixed entity (once and for all) because the very nature of culture is becoming; any appeal to simulacra stands in direct opposition to culture. It is this very fixing of a concept of culture that prompts Nietzsche to refer it to the slave type; for, it is the slave type that will accept the foundations of a conceptual culture without questioning the masters that had invented it. This discussion relates directly to the discussions of the valuations good/bad and good/evil in ‘The Genealogy of Morals.’
It is through the gregarious that conceptual culture (or, the conceptualization of culture) covers over the very arbitrariness of the values created. No one questions these values, these morals, right, wrong, truth, falsehood - in fact, these antitheses are the very product of a conceptually gregarious culture. This may be what Gilles Deleuze would refer to as an overcoding of values, whereby the values are coded to fit a particular system of articulation (maybe Ludwig Wittgenstein would refer to these systems as ‘Language Games’) and then overcoded in order to conceal the arbitrary nature of those systems; this, in turn, provides the security of the species by applying the code to other areas until one no longer wills oneself. Overcoding, put simply, ensures the survival of the species by ensuring the dominance of the code.
What is lacking in the conceptual culture, or, as Klossowski would have it, what is covered over, is the ‘the fact of experimentation.’ Can a culture, a lived culture, survive this lack? What does culture amount to if it only repeats, replicates, re-establishes, the status quo? And here we have the combat of culture. But, and again, Nietzsche is on the offensive, waging his own war on the conceptual culture of the gregarious. In Nietzsche’s combat there are to be no sacred cows. Language itself must be uprooted! Nietzsche’s mission statement is, “to give men back the courage of their natural drives / to check their self-underestimation… / to remove antitheses from things after comprehending that we have projected them there…” [NVC: p. 10]. Yet, why courage? Nietzsche believes that inequality prevails, yet, this inequality is not reflected in the gregarious and thus man has lost his courage to bear this inequality. The idea of the Eternal Return will serve to bring this courage back to man and ultimately split humanity down the middle, into those that accept the Return and those that do not. In which case, the question of advocacy of Nietzsche’s own combat against culture will depend on whether one is willing to accept the implications of the Eternal Return.
NVC: Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle: Pierre Klossowski
AC: The Anti-Christ: Friedrich Nietzsche
BGE: Beyond Good and Evil: Friedrich Nietzsche
GM: The Genealogy of Morals: Friedrich Nietzsche
GMM: Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals (on a supposed right to lie because of philanthropic concerns): Immanuel Kant
BHP: A Brief History of the Paradox: Roy Sorensen
IV: The Investigations: Ludwig Wittgenstein
PN: The Philosophy of Nietzsche: Gilles Deleuze